Is it true that Ukraine will switch off mobile service during air raid alerts under “law No. 395/2026”?

Two documents carry number 395/2026: a presidential decree of 19 May 2026 appointing a judge of the Chernihiv Court of Appeal, and a government resolution of 27 March 2026 that extended an environmental experiment. Neither concerns telecommunications. The database of the Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine's parliament) has no law with this number.^{[9][10][11][5][7]}

In Ukraine only the Verkhovna Rada passes laws. The government issues resolutions and orders. This alone gives the forgery away.^[7][14]

No such system exists. According to the Center for Countering Disinformation (a state body under the National Security and Defense Council, CCD), the “choose your operator” links lead to one anonymous Telegram channel with news and ads. In the August version, all three buttons (Kyivstar, Vodafone, lifecell) led to one third-party site that asked for a phone number and the digits of an incoming call.^[1][2][12]

Official sirens and the state alert system work separately from the mobile network. A phone without service cannot receive real-time alerts, and no app can get around that.^[12][18]

Yes. In June 2025 the Rada's national security committee set up a working group: they discussed temporarily limiting mobile internet where Shahed drones fly (Ukrainian SIM cards were found in downed drones). A full cut of service in regions was not considered. In September 2025 the General Staff said the army has no means of jamming mobile networks. No decision to cut service was ever made.^{[15][16][17][13]}

The opposite: they try to preserve service. Since 2022 national roaming has been in place: if your own operator's network is gone, you can manually pick another operator's network. Since July 2024 the regulator has required operators to give base stations 10 hours of backup power, and some stations 72 hours of generator power.^[19][20]

The national security committee discusses limiting mobile internet along the path of Shahed drones. Kyivstar told journalists it cannot disclose its measures. No decision.^[16][15]

First version of the fake found: “law No. 156/2025” on cutting service, with a screenshot of decree No. 395/2025 on sanctions. Telegram “systems” called “Kartuz” and “Tryzub” are promoted. Debunked by Spravdi and VoxCheck.^[13][8]

The General Staff: the issue is not about electronic warfare, and the army has no means of jamming mobile networks.^[17]

A new wave: now “law No. 395/2025”, with a call to subscribe to “Tryzub” by 15 September. “Tryzub” turned out to be an anonymous channel with a chain of bots and subscriptions.^[14]

The number is changed to “395/2026”. The CCD refutes it: documents with this number are about something else. Detector Media, RBC-Ukraine and UNN report on it.^[5][6][4]

A version with an “autonomous system” and an activation deadline. Buttons for three operators lead to one third-party site that asks for a phone number and the digits of an incoming call.^[12]

A separate, real incident: hackers sent false alerts about radiation and a chemical threat through the app. This increased the fear of missing a real alert.^[18]

The CCD again refutes the fake: there is no “law 395/2026”, the links lead to an anonymous channel. The refutation is retold by LB.ua, UNN and Inform.zp.ua (in Ukrainian, Russian and English).^[1][3][2]

No laws or decisions limiting service during alerts have been adopted. The goal is to gain subscribers by playing on the fear of being left without alerts.^[1][3][2]

The May wave: number 395/2026 belongs to a decree on a judge and a resolution on environmental control.^[5][6][4]

Independent check: there is no such law on the Rada's website, and only parliament passes laws. They also debunked the 2025 version.^[7][8]

Early 2025 waves: the “laws” No. 156/2025 and No. 395/2025 turned out to be decrees on other matters, and “Kartuz” and “Tryzub” are Telegram channels.^[13][14]

Analyzed the August version: a trap site instead of a “system”, and the signs of fraud.^[12]

In 2025 limiting mobile internet along the path of drones was indeed discussed, but not adopted; the army cannot jam mobile networks.^[15][16][17]

No separate statement from the operators about the 2026 waves was found.

Posts with “law 395/2026” and operator-choice buttons that lead to one channel with news and ads.^[1]

2026-11-04

Regional channels spread the version with “law No. 395/2025” and “Tryzub”.^[14]

2025-09-15

The version with “law No. 156/2025” and a screenshot from the Office of the President's website.^[13]

2025-06-21

Outcome: Fake: the number belongs to a decree on military administration, and the “systems” are Telegram channels.^[13][8]

Outcome: Fake: No. 395/2025 is a decree on sanctions.^[14]

Outcome: There were no such decisions, and the Ministry of Digital Transformation has no such systems.^[5]

Outcome: The CCD refuted it; half a year later the same text came back.^[5][6]